While Advani was relieved of his position as the party chief under pressure from the RSS following his pro-Jinnah observations, Singh, who is a much lesser figure, has had to pay a heavier price for defying the party line.

But, irrespective of the political fallout, what has to be considered are the distorted analyses of the events prior to independence in his book: 'Jinnah - India, Partition, Independence'. His failure to understand why Jinnah is excoriated in India is a strange affectation considering that it was the Muslim League leader's two-nation theory which paved the way for partition to the accompaniment of communal violence sparked by his dangerously provocative Direct Action to secure Pakistan.

Once the religious passions had been whipped up by Jinnah, based on his 'Islam is in danger' assertion because of the dominance of Hindus under Congress rule, there was little that Nehru and even Mahatma Gandhi could do to stem the tide.

True, the Congress also made mistakes. For instance, a more accommodative attitude towards the Muslim League in the United Provinces (now Uttar Pradesh) after the Congress's 1937 election victory could have diffused the situation. As M.R.A. Baig, one of Jinnah's advisors, said: 'Pakistan never came to Jinnah's mind till about 1939... When the Congress formed the provincial government (in UP), he expected them to form a Congress-League coalition, which was his concept of Hindu-Muslim unity...'

'It was only when the Congress, wedded to political theories perfectly applicable to Britain, such as majority party government, and not recognising that in Indian conditions, a numerical majority could be synonymous with a communal majority ... that he turned to Pakistan.'

There were other miss-steps, too, as noted by Abul Kalam Azad in his 'India Wins Freedom' as when Nehru said that the Congress would enter the constituent assembly 'completely unfettered by agreements'. Since Jinnah interpreted this as a rejection of the Cabinet Mission plan, which the Muslim League had accepted, he also repudiated it and said that Pakistan remained the only course left for his party.

Even if the Congress' authoritarian instincts (which again manifested themselves during the 1975-77 Emergency) made it dismissive of other parties, they are not sufficient to explain Jinnah's transformation from a constitutionalist to a votary of street violence and from an 'ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity' to a patron of communal carnage.

As is clear, there were two Jinnahs - one a hero and the other a villain. The hero was driven by his thwarted ambitions because of the ascendancy of Gandhi and Nehru to turn into its opposite with a vengeance. Jaswant Singh's mistake is that he ignores this final phase of Jinnah's career.

(19.8.2009-Amulya Ganguli is a political analyst. He can be reached at aganguli@mail.com)